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1 Introduction
Government procurement contracts are a signicant part of many economies, often amount-
ing to 15-20 percent of GDP (WTO, 2013). When seeking a provider for a government
contract, it has been a long-standing tradition that the nature of the bidding favors domes-
tic rms over foreign ones. One common method of doing so has been the use of a price
preference in which the contract is awarded to a foreign rm only if that rm's bid is suf-
ciently lower than the lowest bid tendered by a domestic rm. For example, under the
European Community regulations, the contract was awarded to a member rm so long as its
bid was no more than three percent higher than the lowest non-member bid (Branco, 1994).
Across OECD countries, the estimates of Francois, Nelson, and Palmeter (1996) nd that
the implied margins can be as large as 30 percent. Such a preferential procurement policy
can arise from a number of causes including dierent costs across countries (as in McAfee
and McMillan, 1989) or a government which values domestic rm prots more than those of
foreign rms (central to Branco's, 1994, analysis).
Obviously, price preferences are not the only policy which discriminates against foreign
rms, with taris being but one alternative. Given the general drive towards trade liber-
alization, it is therefore important to understand how price preferences and taris compare
with one another. In particular, in 1996, the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)
took steps towards non-discrimination in which signatories agree to a procurement selection
process in which foreign rms are treated no dierently than their domestic competitors.1
As this agreement is among WTO members, understanding the substitutability between
equal treatment under the bidding process and trade policy is important in understanding
how the two agreements may complement each other in the broader push towards trade
liberalization.2
1See WTO (2013) for a detailed description of this agreement. For a thorough review of the successes
and shortcomings of the WTO, see Bagwell et al. (2016).
2In a model of perfect competition (which is fundamentally dierent than the auction literature we draw
from) Evenett and Hoekman (2005) compare price preferences to non-transparency, measured as a cost to
foreign rms.
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In this paper, we compare the use of price preferences to taris, establishing conditions
under which the two are equivalent and when that equivalence fails, which provides insights
into the ability of bans on price preferences in reducing protection against foreign rms.
The environment that we consider is an auction for a government contract in which two
rms, one domestic and one foreign, tender bids to the domestic government. Under a price
preference, following practice, the contract is awarded to the domestic rm so long as its bid
is no more than a xed percentage higher than that of the foreign rm. In contrast, under
an ad valorem tari on a successful foreigner's bid, the contract goes to the rm with the
lowest bid. Here, however, a successful foreigner must pay a tari to the government.3
We begin by establishing an equivalence in the bidding game between the two policies,
i.e., for each price preference there exists an ad valorem tari that results in equal expected
prots. In particular, under the equivalent tari, the foreign rm scales up its bid so that it
achieves the same net-of-tari payo if it wins the contract. We then continue by considering
government welfare under the two policies in a setting where, as in Branco (1994), it may
value domestic rm prots. In addition, and critically, we allow the government to value
savings from a lower price dierently from tari revenues (as might be the case if tari
revenues are costly to collect). When government welfare depends simply on net revenues,
i.e., tari revenues are valued equally (but opposite) from expenditures, the same tari
equivalent to the price preference in the bidding game results in equivalent government
welfare. Thus, as in Branco (1994), the optimal tari would be positive. Further, this
equivalence allows us to utilize the variety of results found in the price preference literature
in a tari setting. In addition, it suggests that in such a situation, even when price preferences
are eliminated, it does not necessarily aect the equilibrium levels of protection or welfare
since the government can switch to an equivalent tari. As such movements to reduce
3Though, in this paper, our use of a tari is literally a discriminatory tax on the foreign rm, it need not
be the case in the real world. For instance, the government could be imposing a tari on an imported input
specic to the foreign rm but which is also used throughout the domestic economy. Alternatively, the tari
could represent a prot tax on both rms, but the domestic rm is able to take advantage of a tax credit
that the foreign rm can not. Thus this is discriminatory, but not overtly so. We discuss such extensions
after establishing our baseline results.
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protectionism are likely to be most eective when considering both taris and non-tari
interventions such as price preferences jointly.
That said, there are situations in which the bidders' equivalent tari is not equivalent for
the government. For example, it may be the case that tari revenues are valued dierently
than expenditures. This can be the case if, as found by Riezman and Slemrod (1987),
taris are costly to collect, implying that a dollar of gross tari revenues are less valuable to
the government than reducing expenditures by a dollar. Other examples include additional
features of government welfare that depend on the tari (such as the impact of a tari on
non-governmental consumers) or when other commitments (such as free trade agreements)
constrain taris. In particular, if taris are less valued than expenditures, we nd that
moving from the price preference to an unconstrained tari still works to reduce protection.
Finally, note that these results are not specic to competition between domestic and foreign
rms. As such, our results contribute to the more general discussion on discrimination in
public procurement auctions.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and demonstrate the
equivalence of the price preference and the tari in the bidding game. Section 3 describes
government welfare and lays out conditions under which the equivalence does - and does
not - extend to the government. This section also compares welfare for the various players
under the two policies and compares them to the optimal price preference derived by Branco
(1994). Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The model has three players: a government, a domestic rm, and a foreign rm. The govern-
ment has a project of value V that it wishes to be completed. Prior to the commencement
of the game, each rm i = d; f obtains a private cost ci drawn independently from cumula-
tive distribution Gi() with density gi() on support [ci; ci], where ci  0. We assume that
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V > maxfcd; cfg so that in equilibrium the contract is awarded to one of the rms.4 Both
rms simultaneously submit bids bi with the winner, determined by the governmental policy
in place, being paid its winning bid. The mechanism for determining that winner, however,
diers across policy regimes (price preference or tari). The timing of the game is that,
given its policy regime, the government chooses the extent of protection, following which
bids are submitted and a winner is chosen. We assume that Gi has properties such that the
equilibrium bid functions are monotone in ci and the bid functions are continuous in the
range of non-prohibitive price preferences/taris.5 In this section, we focus on the subgame
given the policy regime and the level of protection.
2.1 Price Preference
We begin with the price preference. Here, the domestic rm enjoys a price preference of
p, where 0 < p < 1, and wins as long as (1  p) bd < bf , i.e., so long as its bid is no
more 1=(1  p) times that of the foreign rm's bid. Note when (1  p) bd = bf , the contract
is randomly awarded. Also notice that this price preference is linear with respect to the
bids and reects the norm used in practice.6 The linear price preference studied here is a
restriction on the policy space relative to that considered by McAfee and McMillan (1989)
and Branco (1994), a distinction that will be important when considering welfare in the next
section.
With a price preference p in place, the expected prot for the domestic bidder is:
E(d) = (bd   cd) Pr

bd <
bf
1  p

: (1)
4This assumption eases the presentation of the results on the optimal level of protection as the contract
is always fullled in equilibrium. When this is not the case, it is necessary to modify the welfare function by
integrating only across the cost space resulting in bids no greater than V . Further, having a V that is nite
also eliminates other equilibria. See Kaplan and Wettstein (2000).
5See Reny and Zamir (2004) and Lebrun (2006) for the necessary assumptions.
6See Evenett (2002) for discussion.
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Similarly, expected prot for the foreign bidder is:
E(f ) = (bf   cf ) Pr

bf
1  p < bd

: (2)
From the rst order conditions of these equations, one obtains bid functions bi(ci; p), i.e.,
the bid each rm would submit conditional on its own cost and the price preference. We
make the standard assumption that a rm never bids below its cost even when it has a zero
chance of winning.7 We dene inverse bid functions ci(bi; p), i.e., the cost that produces a
given bid conditional on the price preference.
2.2 Tari
Under the tari, the contract is awarded to whichever rm submits the lowest bid. The
dierence here to a standard procurement auction is that, if the foreign rm is successful,
then it pays an ad valorem tari t on its bid. In this case, domestic expected prots are
(where we use tildes to denote variables and functions in the tari regime):
E(~d) = (~bd   cd) Pr

~bd < ~bf

; (3)
while those of the foreign rm are:
E(~f ) =

(1  t)~bf   cf

Pr

~bf < ~bd

: (4)
As with the price preference, the rst order conditions for expected prots under the
tari will dene bid functions ~bi(ci; t) which are assumed to have the same properties as the
bid functions in the price preference case.8 Although we focus on a tari on the foreign
rm's bid (i.e., what is directly observed by the government), we could equivalently consider
7This assumption eliminates multiple equilibria. See Kaplan and Zamir (2015).
8In an earlier version of the paper, Cole and Davies (2014), we explicitly derive the inverse bid functions
for a specic distribution of costs.
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a tari on the foreign rm's cost.
For the rest of the paper we will assume the following property.
Property 1. If a bidder's cost distribution increases stochastically, so will his bid distribu-
tion.
One interpretation of Property 1 is that as the tari rises so too does the bid is one of
tari pass-through. Several studies nd that rms facing taris pass on at least a portion of
this to their consumers via higher prices, with Feenstra (1989) serving as the seminal work
and Han, et al. (2014) and Marchand (2012) providing recent examples. Note, however, that
this is not the only possibility. Studies such as Bagwell and Lee (2015) show that because
overseas tari reductions can work to lower domestic prices by driving out low-productivity
rms, this can result in export prices falling as taris rise. Ludema and Yu (forthcoming)
examine a more complex setting in which a tari increase can also lead to lower prices as
rms downgrade the quality of their product (thereby reducing the cost and the equilibrium
price). Using rm level data, Ludema and Yu nd evidence consistent with this possibility,
particularly for low productivity rms. Such considerations, however, are entirely missing in
our setting where there is only one quality, the number of rms is xed, and non-tari costs
are exogenous to the rm.
The property should hold in almost all cases. It is proved in Lebrun (1998) for two bidders
when the cost distributions have the same support.9 Combining this with the continuity
results in Lebrun (2002) ensures that the bid distribution will at least weakly increase even
for dierent supports. Using the techniques in Lebrun (2006), the result should extend to
a strict increase for dierent supports. There is not, however, a general result for more
than two bidders when there are at least three dierent supports.10 As discussed below,
violations of Property 1 does not aect our equivalency results but does have implications
for the optimal level of protection. We now state our rst two results.
9Lebrun (1998) also nds that the other bidder's bid distribution increases and hence the price paid would
increase as well.
10A counter example is provided in Lebrun (2002).
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Lemma 1. For each tari t on the foreign rm's bid, there is a tari  = t
1 t on the cost
that results in equivalent bidding behavior. When the tari of  on the foreign rm's costs
is combined with prot tax of T = t on the foreign rm, its expected prots are the same as
the tari of t on its bid.
Proof. For the foreign rm, expected prots with a tari of t on the bid can be rewritten as:
E(tbf ) =

(1  t)~bf   cf

Pr

~bf < ~bd

= (1  t)

~bf   cf
1  t

Pr

~bf < ~bd

: (5)
This is equivalent to a tari on costs of  = t
1 t and a prot tax of T = t on the foreign rm
since we have
(1  t)

~bf   cf
1  t

Pr

~bf < ~bd

= (1  T )

~bf   (1 + )cf

Pr

~bf < ~bd

: (6)
Thus, behavior and prots will be equivalent. Since a prot tax is proportion to prots,
it will not aect behavior whether or not it is imposed. When the prot tax is discriminatory
and not levied on the domestic rm, the domestic rm's prots are the same regardless of
whether the tari is levied on the foreign bid or its equivalent on cost.11 Again, since a prot
tax is not distortionary, a non-discriminatory prot tax will not aect bidding behavior.
Lemma 2. If Property 1 holds, expected domestic prots increase in the tari.
Proof. By Property 1 an increase in a tari on costs increases the foreign bid. This increases
the probability that the domestic rm wins, increasing its expected prot even if it does
not alter its bidding strategy. If it does so, this re-optimization can only further increase
expected domestic prots. Since, by virtue of Lemma 1 a tari on the bid is equivalent to a
tari on the cost, the same holds for taris on the bid.
Lemma 2 highlights the role of Property 1 since, should it fail, an increase in the tari
11One way in which an otherwise non-discriminatory prot tax can be made discriminatory is if only the
domestic rm is able to take advantage of tax osets that are only available to those producing locally.
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can lower expected domestic prots. As shown in the following, this has implications for the
optimal level of protection.
2.3 Equivalence
We can now establish an equivalence between the tari and price preference regimes.
Proposition 1. If fbd(cd; p); bf (cf ; p)g are equilibrium bid functions under a price premium
p, then
n
~bd(cd; t);~bf (cf ; t)
o
:= fbd(cd; p); (1  p) 1bf (cf ; p)g are equilibrium bid functions for
a tari t = p. Furthermore, each rm's equilibrium expected prots are equal across the two
policy regimes.
Proof. Since ~bf (cf ; t) = bf (cf ; p)=(1   p) and ~bd(cf ; t) = bd(cf ; p), expected prots for the
domestic rm under the price preference can be written as
E(d) = (bd   cd)Pr

bd <
bf (cf ; p)
1  p

= (~bd   cd)Pr

~bd < ~bf (cf ; t)

= E(~d); (7)
which is the same as domestic rm prots under the tari regime with t = p. As such,
the bid that maximizes E(d) will also maximize E(~d). Hence, since fbd(cd; p); bf (cf ; p)g
form an equilibrium under price preferences, under taris given that the foreign rm bids
according to ~bf (cf ; t), the domestic rm would choose to bid according to ~bd(cd; t).
Likewise, since ~bd(cd; t) = bd(cd; p), using a change of variables from bf to (1   p)~bf ,
equilibrium expected foreign prots under the price preference can be written as:
E(f ) = (bf   cf )Pr

bf
1  p < bd(cd; p)

= ((1 p)~bf   cf )Pr

~bf < ~bd(cd; t)

= E(~f ): (8)
Hence, a bid of bf that maximizes E(f ) given bd(cd; p) will equal (1   p)~bf for a bid ~bf
that maximizes E(~f ) given ~bd(cd; p): Therefore, when bf (cf ; p) and bd(cd; p) constitute an
equilibrium under a price preference p, ~bf (cf ; t) =
bf (cf ;p)
1 p and
~bd(cd; t) = bd(cd; p) are an
equilibrium under taris where t = p. A more general version of Proposition 1, albeit
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potentially less intuitive, is presented in the Appendix. This general proof in the Appendix
extends the equivalence to nonlinear policies; i.e., a tari rate that is a function of the foreign
rm's bid and the price preference rule as described in Branco (1994).
Intuitively, when moving from the price preference p to a tari t equal to p, the foreign
rm increases its bid so that its after-tari payment is the same. Since this does not alter the
probability of one rm winning over another, it does not change behavior by the domestic
rm. Together these imply that equilibrium expected prots are the same.
2.4 The Government
In this subsection we establish conditions under which the two policies are also equivalent
for the government. In both regimes, the government sets the relevant tari to maximize its
expected welfare function, which is the sum of the value of the project, the expected payo
conditional on the domestic rm winning, and the expected payo conditional on the foreign
rm winning. In this, the government weights the domestic rm's prots by  2 [0; 1]. Such
weighting is comparable to McAfee and McMillan (1989). If  = 0, the prot of the domestic
rm has no eect on the government's welfare function and if  = 1, the domestic rm's
prot fully enters the government's welfare function (as it does in Branco, 1994). In addition,
in the tari regime, taris are weighted by  > 0. If  = 1, then welfare depends on net
expenditures (i.e., the bid paid net of tari revenues collected). If  < 1, this can represent
a situation in which revenues are costly to collect. Evidence of such costly administration
is provided in Riezman and Slemrod (1987).12 Alternatively, if  > 1 this can represent the
interests of a Leviathan government which values incoming funds that it can appropriate for
itself.13
Denote cd(b; p), cf (b; p), ~cd(b; p), ~cf (b; p) as the respective inverse bid functions for the
12In this vein, it is natural to assume that for a negative tari (i.e., a subsidy) that there is a similar cost
to providing the subsidy, making   1 for such cases. This assumption prevents a scenario in which the
government's cost is less than the subsidy. To streamline presentation, we focus on non-negative taris and
raise this issue only when necessary.
13See Padovano (2004) for a review of the Leviathan literature.
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domestic and foreign rms under price preferences and taris. The conditional on a cost c^d
for the domestic rm, conditional expected welfare under the price preference is:
W (c^d; p) = V  
Z cf ((1 p)bd(c^d;p);p)
cf
bf (cf ; p)gf (cf ) dcf
 
Z cf
cf ((1 p)bd(c^d;p);p)
[bd (c^d; p)   (bd(c^d; p)  c^d)] gf (cf ) dcf (10)
and expected welfare is:
W (p) =
Z cd
cd
W (c^d; p) gd(c^d)dc^d: (11)
Likewise, under the tari, expected welfare is:
~W (t) =
Z cd
cd
~W (c^d; t) gd(c^d)dc^d: (12)
where
~W (c^d; t) = V  
Z ~cf(~bd(c^d;t);t)
cf
h
(1  t)~bf (cf ; t)
i
gf (cf ) dcf
 
Z cf
~cf(~bd(c^d;t);t)
h
~bd (c^d; t)  

~bd(c^d; t)  c^d
i
gf (cf ) dcf : (13)
The above builds the framework for our second proposition.
Proposition 2. When  = 1, the price preference and tari regimes are equivalent for
government welfare whenever p = t.
Proof. From Proposition 1, we have that inverse bid functions are such that ~cf

~bd(c^d; p); p

=
cf ((1  p)bd (c^d; p) ; p), meaning that when t = p, the probability of winning under either
regime for a foreign rm with a given cost is the same. With this in mind and using Propo-
sition 1's results for the bidding functions, welfare under the price preference, equation (10),
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can be rewritten as:
W (c^d; p) = V  
Z ~cf(~bd(c^d;p);p)
cf
(1  p)~bf (cf ; p)gf (cf ) dcf
+
Z cf
~cf(~bd(c^d;p);p)

 ~bd (c^d; p) + ~d(c^d; p)

gf (cf ) dcf : (14)
As such, when p = t and  = 1, we nd that:
W (c^d; p) = ~W (c^d; p) : (15)
Integrating across the potential domestic costs, we see that the equivalence therefore extends
to the government when  = 1.
Intuitively, moving from a price preference to the equivalent tari results in no change
for the domestic rm bid and the foreign rm increasing its bid by the amount of the tari it
would pay. When  = 1 and the government values a dollar saved from a lower bid the same
as a dollar gained from a higher tari, the higher bid paid to a winning foreigner is exactly
oset by the tari revenue, making it indierent between the policy regimes whenever p = t.
As with the equivalency for rms, this does not rely on Property 1.
3 The Equilibrium Level of Protection
In the previous section, we showed that for rms, for each price preference there is an
equivalent tari and vice versa with this equivalence extending to the government whenever
its objective depends solely on net expenditures. In this section, we discuss the government's
optimal level of protection under each policy regime. For the moment, we focus on the case
where  = 1 so that the equivalence extends to the government. The advantage of doing
so is that it allows us to more easily compare our results to the existing literature on price
preferences to identify when the optimal tari is positive.
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In the literature, two situations are often oered for why foreign rms may be discrimi-
nated against. The rst is when domestic prots are valued. Examples here include Branco
(1994) and McAfee and McMillan (1989). The second is when foreign rms have an expected
cost advantage as in McAfee and McMillan (1989) (which is an extension of the classic result
of Myerson, 1981).14 Note that the above equivalence result encompasses both cases. Never-
theless, this does not immediately imply that a price preference or tari will be used because
those studies consider optimal policies under either direct mechanisms (Branco, 1994 and
McAfee and McMillan, 1989) or when price preferences can be non-linear in a rst-price
auction (Branco, 1994 and McAfee and McMillan, 1985). As derived in those papers, the
optimal price preference is indeed non-linear in the foreign bid. Our analysis, however, re-
stricts itself to the types of policies actually observed, i.e., linear price preferences and ad
valorem taris. We can, however, state the following two results.
Lemma 3. The government's preferred linear price preference (and equivalent tari if  = 1)
cannot result in strictly higher welfare than its preferred price preference when non-linear
prices preferences are permitted.
Proof. Since the set of linear price preferences is a subset of the price preference space
that includes non-linear ones, the optimum from this set cannot do better for the home
government. Furthermore if the preferred price preference is non-linear, as in the cases
considered by Branco (1994) and McAfee and McMillan (1989), the government's equilibrium
welfare under its preferred linear price preference must be lower than the one achieved under
these alternative policies.15
Proposition 3. If cost distributions are the same between the domestic and foreign rms,
then whenever domestic prots are valued, the government's preferred price preference and
its preferred tari are strictly positive for  close to 1.
14See Jahiel and Lamy (2015) for a recent discussion on the generality of this result.
15Cole and Davies (2014) provide a numeric comparison under the preferred tari (when  = 1) and the
optimal non-linear preference derived by Branco (1994) for a rst-price auction. Fronk (2015) solves for the
optimal price preference in a setting where costs are Pareto distributed and nds that the optimal price
preference is in fact a linear one.
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Proof. Rewrite (12) as:
~W (t) = V   E
h
~b(t)
i
+ E [TR(t)] + E [~d(t)] : (16)
Written this way, welfare is the value of the project minus the expected winning bid plus the
expected benets from tari revenues and the value of the expected prots of the domestic
rm. Taking the derivative of ~W (t) with respect to the tari yields:
d ~W (t)
dt
=  
dE
h
~b(t)
i
dt
+ 
dE [TR(t)]
dt
+ 
dE [~d(t)]
dt
: (17)
Rearranging by adding and subtracting dE[TR(t)]
dt
yields:
d ~W (t)
dt
=
dE [TR(t)]
dt
 
dE
h
~b(t)
i
dt| {z }+(  1)dE [TR(t)]dt + dE [~d(t)]dt : (18)
From Proposition 2, the underbraced term is equivalent to dW (p)
dp
when  = 0, which we will
dene to be dW^ (p)
dp
.
As has been established in papers such as McAfee and McMillan (1989), when there
are cost distribution asymmetries which favor the foreign rm it is benecial to use a non-
linear protection.16 If, on the other hand, the cost distributions are identical, the expected
payment is minimized under free trade as this results in identical bid functions, ensuring that
the lowest-cost rm wins the contract (which is the optimal mechanism if the government
is constrained to always make a purchase when value is above costs). Thus, at t = 0, with
equal cost distributions, ~cf

~bd(c^d; 0); 0

= c^d, we have
dW^ (p)
dp

t=p=0
= 0. (Note the optimality
of setting p = 0 is not a corner solution since p < 0 is also inferior to p = 0.) From equation
16Or, more generally, to discriminate against the rm with the cost advantage.
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(18), at equal cost distributions we then have:17
d ~W (t)
dt

t=0
= (  1) E[~bf (cf ; t)]

t=0
+ 
dE [~d(t)]
dt

t=0
: (19)
The rst term is negative for any  < 1. By Lemma 1 the second term is positive when
 > 0. Thus, when cost distributions are identical and  is suciently close to one, a positive
tari will be used when  > 0. Similarly, since rst order condition under the price premium
regime would be obtained by setting  = 1 in (19), when cost distributions are identical a
positive price preference will be used when domestic prots are valued.
Thus, when cost distributions are the same, protection will be used so long as domestic
prots are valued and  is suciently large.18 Although we do not rely on a specic cost
distribution for this result, it has been demonstrated by Cole and Davies (2014) using Kaplan
and Zamir's (2012) results for uniformly distributed costs and a tari and by Hubbard and
Paarsch (2009) who simulate bid functions under a variety of cost distributions with a price
preference. Again, when  = 1 it is possible to extend their ndings from one policy to
another.
When cost distributions dier, as in McAfee and McMillan (1989), there is an advantage
to discriminating against the rm with the advantageous cost. In that case, the result
depends on the rate at which the bid functions move under the relevant ranges of the foreign
cost. As initially shown by Myerson (1981) and expanded on by others including McAfee and
McMillan (1989) (who expand the number of bidders), the government's expected payment
can be lowered by introducing a non-linear price preference against the rm with an expected
cost advantage. When using a linear price preference, the simulations provided by McAfee
and McMillan (1989) show that there is still an advantage to protection (albeit a smaller
17Note that dE[TR(t)]dt

t=0
= E[~bf (cf ; t)]

t=0
.
18Note that our assumption that   1 when t < 0 rules out a subsidy as the optimal policy. However, if
Property 1 fails, expected domestic prots decrease in the tari and a subsidy can become optimal unless 
is suciently larger than 1.
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one as per Lemma 3) and that the losses from using a linear rather than the optimal price
preference are small. Using the equivalence result, this indicates that a positive tari would
be used in such a case as well. Furthermore, as their simulations do not include domestic
prots in the government welfare function, adding that would give the government further
reason to use protection. In particular, this latter eect can give rise to protection even when
the domestic rm(s) have cost advantages. Thus, our equivalence result allows us to extend
the equilibrium use of taris into the variety of settings already considered by those using
price preferences which show that in a variety of settings protection will be used to increase
government welfare.19 As a nal point, recognize Myerson (1981) and McAfee and McMillan
(1989) are based on particular assumptions under which Property 1 holds. Nevertheless,
our equivalency result does not hinge upon this. As such, any results on the optimal price
preference would carry over to the optimal equivalent tari.
In addition to showing that protection will be used, we can identify conditions for which
the equilibrium level of protection is increasing in the weight placed on domestic prots.
Proposition 4. The government's preferred level of protection is increasing in .
Proof. Note from Equation (17), the rst derivative of ~W is increasing in . Let us add  as
a parameter to welfare by denoting welfare as ~W (t; ) : Denote t1 as the optimal tari level
for 1. Optimality of t1 means that ~W (t1; 1)  ~W (t2; 1) for all t2 including t2  t1. Since
~W (t1; 1) = ~W (t2; 1)+
R t1
t2
d ~W(~t;1)
dt
d~t, we have
R t1
t2
d ~W(~t;1)
dt
d~t  0. Thus, for 3 > 1, we haveR t1
t2
d ~W(~t;3)
dt
d~t  0: Hence, W (t1; 3)  W (t; 3) for all t  t1. Finally, if t1 > 0 and dE[~d(t)]dt >
0, then we have d
~W (t1;3)
dt
> 0 and there exists a t > t1 such that W (t; 3) > W (t1; 3) { the
optimal must be strictly higher than t1.
Note that this depends in an obvious way on Lemma 2; if domestic prots fall in protection
then the optimal level of protection declines in . Finally, note that this protection is optimal
from the perspective of the government. Dening global welfare as the sum of W and
19It should be noted, however, that the simulations of Deltas and Evenett (1997) nd that such gains are
likely to be modest.
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expected prots, the global welfare maximizing level of protection will generally dier. In
one particular case, the solution to global welfare maximization is simple.
Proposition 5. When  = 0 and cost distributions are identical, the globally desired price
preference is zero. If   1, the global welfare maximizing tari is zero.
Proof. When  = 0, welfare under the price preference is V minus the expected production
cost of the winner. Thus, it is advantageous from a global perspective to award the contract
to the lowest cost rm which happens when there is no price preference. Further, when   1
and any tari revenue enters global welfare negatively, no tari will be used.
Note the importance of the welfare weights in this result. If  > 0 there is a \double
counting" of domestic prots that gives an incentive to protect the domestic rm on a global
as well as national level. Similarly if  > 1, there is a double counting of tari revenues (as
might occur if such revenues are being used to fund a publicly-provided good). Conversely, if
 < 1, then a corner solution would be reached in the optimal tari (i.e., the globally optimal
tari would be zero). These double-counting issues must therefore be kept in mind when
discussing global welfare. Note that as bids cancel out in this calculation, it is independent
of Property 1.
3.1 Non-equivalence
In the above discussion we focused on the case where policy equivalence holds not only for
rms, but for the government as well. This latter condition requires two things:  = 1 and
feasibility of the equivalent tari. As noted above,  need not equal 1 since tari revenue
may be less valued (such as when there is a cost to collecting revenues) or more valued (as
in the case of corruption) than payments. This then begs the question of how the optimal
tari, and thus the optimal level of protection, varies in .
Proposition 6. If expected tari revenues are increasing (decreasing) in the tari at a tari
equal to the preferred price preference, then:
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1. The optimal tari is rising (falling) in .
2. When  < 1, the equilibrium tari is less (more) protectionist than the equilibrium
price preference and the government prefers the price preference over the tari.
3. When  > 1 the equilibrium tari is more (less) protectionist and the government
prefers the tari.
Proof. As discussed above, the equilibrium price preference will equal the tari that sets
(17) equal to zero when  = 1.20 Denote this price preference ~p. Using this in (17) but not
setting  = 1, at a tari of ~p, the government's rst order condition can be written as:
d ~W (c^d; t)
dt

t=~p
= (  1) dE [TR(t)]
dt

t=~p
: (20)
Thus, if tari revenues are increasing in the tari at t = ~p, then the government sets t < ~p if
 < 1: At this tari, welfare is lower than by 1   times the tari revenues as compared to
welfare under a price preference equal to the equilibrium tari. Since that price preference
could have been chosen but was not, this means that welfare under the tari is lower than
under the price preference. If, on the other hand  > 1, t > ~p. Since welfare is higher
under a tari of ~p by    1 times tari revenues, government welfare is higher under the
tari and rises by even more as it reoptimizes. If tari revenues are declining in the tari,
then the comparisons of the equilibrium taris and price preferences reverse themselves.
Nevertheless, the government continues to prefer the price preference when  < 1 and the
tari when  > 1.
Thus if tari revenues are increasing in the tari, then whenever the government prefers
saving on the price it pays relative to an equivalent amount of tari revenues, then moving
from the price preference to the tari will lower protection. Further, despite this perception
by the government, if global welfare is based on equal valuations (as in Proposition 5), then
20Note that this is true even when cost distributions dier.
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moving from the price preference to a tari increases welfare. On the other hand, if  > 1
the reverse happens. As such, values of  6= 1 result in non-equivalence.
A key aspect of this is that it hinges on whether tari revenues are increasing or decreasing
at the tari equal to the equilibrium price preference. If the only incentive for using taris is
to maximize tari revenues, this would exactly cancel out. In the current setting, however,
two other factors inuence the desired degree of protection. First, whenever  > 0 and the
government values additional prots, it has an incentive to increase the tari in order to
benet the domestic rm. If this is large relative to other considerations, it may therefore
be willing to set a level of protection above the tari revenue maximizing choices. Second,
there is the desire to manipulate bid functions and the expected payment. The direction
and size of this depends on cost structures and especially the dierences between them.
A second circumstance that can result in non-equivalence, even if  = 1, is when there
are additional factors feeding into the tari choice. One such situation would be where a
tari aects the pricing of the foreign rm beyond its transaction with the government, i.e.,
there is private as well as public consumption. As discussed by Miyagawa (1991), when
public and private consumption are linked, this aects the optimal level of protection in the
presence of non-constant marginal costs. As the price preference is perhaps more \targetable"
than taris as it only applies to government transactions, it may be preferable as in certain
situations it can be less distortive of consumer behavior. A second situation is where the
choice of tari is limited by, for example, trade agreements. Clearly, regardless of the level
of , if the government's preferred tari exceeds what it can set under the trade agreement,
then equivalence will break down. In particular, if  = 1 and there is a binding limit on the
government's preferred tari, then eliminating price preferences will result in lower (if still
positive) protection, increasing global welfare when there are equal weights.
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3.2 Domestic Content Contingent Policies
In the above, we assumed that the tari could not be avoided via the use of domestic
content (which would not cross a border and would therefore be untaxed). Likewise, we
assumed that the price preference was independent of the extent to which the foreign rm uses
domestic inputs. Nevertheless, many price preferences are contingent on domestic content.
For example, the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. x8301-x8305) waives the price preferences
when at least 50% of inputs are obtained within the US.21 Here, we show that there again
exist an equivalence between domestic content contingent taris and price preferences.
To see this modify the above model so that the price preference p(d) is a decreasing
function of the percentage of domestic content d 2 [0; 1], where the cost for a rm with
baseline cost cf (which is randomly distributed as before) with domestic content share d is
(d; cf ) and  (0; cf ) = cf . Firms take the price preference (or tari) schedule as given and
privately observe their costs. We assume d (d; cf )  0 and that d (1; cf ) is suciently large
so that d 2 (0; 1) when there is a positive tari or price preference. If the price preference is
a step function such as that used by the US where there is no discrimination for any d  0:5,
this would mean that the foreign rm uses either d = 0 or d = 0:5, depending on which
yields higher prots. Further, if d;cf (d; cf ) > 0 the US policy would imply lower cost foreign
rms would be those that would tend to use domestic content. This is intended to capture
the added costs to the foreign rm when sourcing a share d of its requirements cf in the
contracting country. The rm then privately submits its bid along with its domestic content
usage, d. We assume the domestic rm uses only domestic content. While the domestic
bidder's expected prots remain:
E(d) = (bd   cd) Pr

bd <
bf
1  p(d)

: (21)
21See Manuel (2016) for discussion.
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those of the foreign bidder are now:
E(f ) = (bf   (d; cf )) Pr

bf
1  p(d) < bd

: (22)
Similarly, let the tari on the foreign rm's bid also be a function of the endogenously
chosen domestic content t(1  d), where 1   d is the percentage of imported content.22 We
then have:
E(~d) = (~bd   cd) Pr

~bd < ~bf

; (23)
while those of the foreign rm are:
E(~f ) =

[1  t(1  d)]~bf   (d; cf )

Pr

~bf < ~bd

: (24)
As in Proposition 1, when fbd(cf ; p(d)); bf (cf ; p(d); d(cf ))g is the equilibrium under the
domestic-content contingent price preference policy, then
n
~bd(cf ; t(1  d));~bf (cf ; t(1  d); d(cf ))
o
:=

bd(cf ; p(d)); (1  p(d)) 1bf (cf ; p(d); d(cf ))
	
will be an equilibrium when p (d) = t (1  d) . To see this, note that expected prots for the
domestic rm under the price preference can be written as
E(d) = (bd   cd)Pr

bd <
bf (cf ; p(d); d)
1  p(d)

= (~bd   cd)Pr

~bd < ~bf (cf ; t(1  d); d)

= E(~d); (25)
Likewise, using a change of variables from bf to (1   p(d))~bf , equilibrium expected foreign
22While this can be a linear function, i.e. t multiplied by 1  d, so that the tari on cost equivalent would
be on related to the share of cf of foreign origin, we do not make this restriction.
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prots under the price preference can be written as:
E(f ) = (bf   (d; cf ))Pr

bf
1  p(d) < bd(cd; p(d))

= ([1  p(d)]~bf   (d; cf ))Pr

~bf < ~bd(cd; t(1  d))

= E(~f ): (26)
There is equivalence in expected prots for both rms for this combination of policies.
Moreover, since this is true for any value of d, the foreign rm's choice of d is identical under
both policies. Furthermore, as net of tari expected payments to the foreign rm under
these two policies are the same, this equivalence extends to the government under the same
conditions as discussed above. That said, just as in the baseline case, such equivalence can
break down if there are limitations on policies. For example, as noted above, many domestic
content-contingent price preferences are step functions; i.e., there is a price preference when d
is below some threshold and none if the foreign rm meets this minimum standard. As such,
this restriction on the price preference policy space can break equivalence just as restrictions
on tari policy space due to factors such as trade agreements did in the baseline.
4 Conclusion
When awarding government contracts, governments balance several considerations beyond
the price paid, in particular, domestic rm performance. The literature has identied how
this, as well as cost asymmetries across rms, can give rise to the use of price preferences
under which the contract only goes to the foreigner if they underbid their domestic competi-
tor by a suciently large amount. Although this practice has been addressed by the GPA
agreement, other forms of protection remain. Here, we study the use of taris which, in ad-
dition to being discriminatory, generate revenues that may not be equivalent to expenditure
savings. We demonstrate four aspects of this alternative form of protection in procurement.
First, for each linear price preference, there is an equivalent ad valorem tari from the rms'
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perspectives. Furthermore, when a dollar of tari revenues are as valuable as a dollar reduc-
tion in the price paid, the same equivalence extends to the government. Second, when cost
distributions are identical, both protection regimes result in positive levels of protection. As
such, simply banning price preferences is unlikely to stop protection in procurement auc-
tions. Third, both the linear price preference and its equivalent tari are less desirable than
the theoretically optimal but unobserved in practice non-linear price preference. And nally,
depending on the responsiveness of tari revenues and the relative value of tari revenues in
the government's objective, moving from a price preference to a tari can reduce protection
and increase world welfare even as it reduces that of the government.
Combining these results suggests that while eliminating price preferences may help to
open borders, they do not necessarily do so. However, when embedded into other agree-
ments which limit the use of taris (as in the WTO), they may form an eective part of an
overall battle against protectionism. In other words, one would expect the GPA to be more
successful than other similar agreements because it is between WTO members that already
have reciprocal taris agreements in place.
Although we do not examine our model's predictions empirically, it does suggest some
potentially fruitful avenues. For example, in estimating the trade impact of procurement
policy, it may be necessary to control for taris and tari-limiting trade agreement member-
ship since the impact of eliminating price preferences would have a dierent eect in a WTO
member (where taris are bound) and a non-member (where taris can be altered to sub-
stitute for the change in price preferences). In addition, the willingness to sign a reciprocal
agreement limiting price preferences may depend on whether one, both, or neither nation
has limits on its tari policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 An Alternative Proof of Equivalence
Here we show the equivalence between a price preference and a tari for not necessarily
linear price preferences/taris.
Each rm is endowed with a cost ci and submits a bid bi based on that. The government
has a price preference for the domestic rm of P (bf ). This means that if bd < bf + P (bf )
then the government purchases from it. Under a tari, the government charges the foreign
rm T (ebf ) should it win, which happens so long as ebd > ebf . This is equivalent to the price
preference if ebd = bd, ebf = bf + T (ebf ), and T (ebf ) = P (bf ). Note that this would also imply
that bid functions are such that btd(cd) := b
p
d(cd) and b
t
f (cf ) := b
p
f (cf ) + P (b
p
f (cf )) form an
equilibrium in the equivalent tari game.
One can see this by looking directly at the two mechanisms: one transfers ti(md;mf ) to
player i and receives the object from player i with probability ai(md;mf ) the other does so
with transfer rule ~ti(md;mf ) and ~ai(md;mf ). In our case, if t; a corresponds to the price
preference and ~t; ~a corresponds to the equivalent tari, then ti(md;mf ) = ~ti(md; f(mf )) and
ai(md;mf ) = ~ai(md; f(mf )) where f(m) = m + P (m). The function P (m) is the price
preference given to player 1, that is,
ad(md;mf ) =
8<:
1 if md < mf + P (mf );
1=2 if md = mf + P (mf );
0 if md > mf + P (mf ):
We also have af (md;mf ) := 1  ad(md;mf ): Note that how we set ~ad and ~af , we have
~ad(md;mf ) =
8<:
1 if md < mf ;
1=2 if md = mf ;
0 if md > mf :
If md(cd);m

f (cf ) is an equilibrium of mechanism t; a, then, for all ci, the choice m

i (ci) equals
arg max
mi(ci)
E[ti(mi(ci);m

 i(c i))  ai(mi(ci);m i(c i))ci]:
However, ~md(c) := m

d(c); ~m

f (c) := f(m

f (c)) would be an equilibrium of mechanism ~t, ~a
since
E[~ti( ~m

d(cd); ~m

f (cf )) ~ai( ~md(cd); ~mf (cf ))ci] = E[~ti(md(cd); f(mf (cf ))) ~ai(md(cd); f(mf (cf )))ci]
= E[ti(m

d(cd);m

f (cf ))  ai(md(cd);mf (cf ))ci]:
Hence, the respective choice of mi(ci) will maximize expected payo.
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